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IN-HOUSE COUNSEL'S WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE ACTION UNDER THE PUBLIC
POLICY EXCEPTION AND RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE DOCTRINE
Raymis H.C. Kim
Abstract Most courts hold that in-house counsel have no cause of action under public
policy or retaliatory discharge exceptions to the at-will employment rule. This is true even
when they are discharged in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy. These
courts have rationalized that such recognition would be contrary to the at-will nature of
attorney-client employment and would have an adverse effect on the attorney-client rela-
tionship. This Comment proposes that courts should extend the public policy exception
and retaliatory discharge doctrine to in-house counsel to protect the public from illegal
corporate acts and provide relief to in-house counsel.
Suppose Medical Instrument, an Illinois corporation, manufactures
and markets kidney dialyzers. It has in stock dozens of defective dia-
lyzers which do not meet Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regu-
lations and may cause substantial injury to patients. The president of
Medical Instrument consults Bob Jones, an in-house counsel, regard-
ing the company's plans to sell the machines. Bob objects to the sale
of dialyzers and threatens to report to the FDA if the dialyzers are put
on the market. Nonetheless, the president orders that the defective
dialyzers be sold. Bob is fired and promptly reports to the FDA. Jane
Smith, another in-house counsel, asks the president to reconsider the
decision to sell. Jane also approaches the Board of Directors in her
attempt to stop the imminent sale. Her pleas are ignored. Finally,
without resigning, she reports the impending sale to the FDA. The
company fires her. Under a recent Illinois Supreme Court case,
neither Jane nor Bob would have a wrongful discharge cause of action
against Medical Instrument.'
Under the traditional common law doctrine of employment-at-will,
an employer or an employee may sever an employment relationship
for any reason, or for no reason at all, absent an existing employment
contract for a fixed term.2 Since the beginning of this century, how-
ever, courts gradually have eroded the at-will employment doctrine by
creating several exceptions. The most widely recognized exception to
1. This hypothetical is based on a recent Illinois Supreme Court case. See Balla v. Gambro,
Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (11. 1991).




the at-will-employment rule is the "public policy exception."' This
exception generally recognizes a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge when an employee is fired for refusing to commit unlawful acts,
for performing important public or ethical obligations, or for exercis-
ing statutory rights.4
The tort of retaliatory discharge is an action under the "public pol-
icy exception" to the at-will employment rule.5 Retaliatory discharge
has been recognized when (1) an employer discharges an employee in
retaliation for employee activities, and (2) the discharge contravenes a
clearly mandated public policy.6 Most jurisdictions that recognize the
public policy exception doctrine also recognize retaliatory discharge as
applied to non-attorney employees.7 However, most courts have
refused to apply these doctrines to in-house counsel because of the
traditional at-will nature of attorney-client employment and the possi-
ble adverse effect such causes of action may have on the attorney-cli-
ent relationship.'
Recently, the supreme courts of Minnesota and Illinois addressed
the issue of whether in-house counsel may bring wrongful discharge
actions against employers. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized
the wrongful discharge action based on an implied contract theory,
without deciding whether it would allow a retaliatory discharge action
by an in-house counsel. 9 The Illinois Supreme Court, on the other
hand, rejected the retaliatory discharge cause of action by an in-house
counsel, even though it found that the discharge was in contravention
of clearly mandated public policy.10
This Comment begins by introducing the public policy and retalia-
tory discharge exceptions to the at-will employment rule. It also pro-
vides background on attorney-client privilege and confidentiality rules,
and then surveys major cases concerning discharge of in-house coun-
sel. Finally, the Comment examines the in-house counsel's dilemma in
reporting illegal acts of the employer-client. The Comment concludes
that when protecting public safety, an in-house counsel should be pro-
3. Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-at-Will & Codes of Ethics: he Professional's Dilemma,
23 VAL. U. L. REv. 33, 49 (1988).
4. Id. at 50.
5. Massingale, supra note 2, at 191.
6. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (Ill. 1981).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 17-25.
8. See, eg., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for
Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (ll. App. Ct. 1986); see infra text accompanying notes
54-58, 79-88.
9. Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
10. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 104.
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vided a remedy under the public policy exception and the retaliatory
discharge doctrine.
I. PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION AND RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. The At-Will Employment Rule and the Public Policy Exception
Doctrine
Originally, supporters justified the at-will employment rule on the
basis of both freedom of contract and freedom of enterprise. 1 The
freedom of contract rationale supported the idea that both the
employer and employee should be free to create or terminate an
employment relationship at any time.12 The freedom of enterprise
rationale provided employers with flexibility in hiring practices and
employees with mobility in the job market, so that employers and
employees could adjust to changing business climates. 3 The at-will
employment rule thus provided crucial flexibility for businesses during
the industrial revolution of the 19th and early 20th centuries.' 4
In the early twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court
granted constitutional protection to the at-will employment rule by
striking down federal and state statutes which made it unlawful to
discharge a worker solely on the basis of union membership.' 5 This
rule conferred upon employers nearly absolute control of workers and
led to abuses, by allowing, for example, long working hours and child
labor. 6 Recognizing the inequities, courts created wrongful discharge
exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. The most important
exceptions are the public policy exception based on tort, the implied
contract exception, and the just cause exception.' 7
The public policy exception to the at-will employment rule has gen-
erally been recognized when an employee is discharged for his or her
11. Massingale, supra note 2, at 188-89.
12. Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 38-40.
13. See Massingale, supra note 2, at 188-89.
14. IL
15. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908). See generally Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 38-39.
16. See Massingale, supra note 2, at 189; Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 43; see, e.g., Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. Massingale, supra note 2, at 191. Among these, the implied contract exception and the




activities in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy.18 A
California appellate court was the first to allow a wrongful discharge
action under the public policy exception.19 That discharge resulted
from the employee's refusal to commit perjury at a state legislative
committee hearing on behalf of the employer.20 However, due to the
firm establishment of the at-will employment doctrine, this case was
not viewed as a serious modification of the at-will employment rule at
that time.21 Then, in 1973, the Supreme Court of Indiana recognized
an employee's claim of wrongful discharge for filing worker's compen-
sation claims.22 Since then, about half of the states have applied the
public policy exception doctrine to discharges for refusing to commit
illegal acts, for performing public or ethical obligations, or for exercis-
ing other statutory rights.23
The retaliatory discharge cause of action is derived from the public
policy exception to at-will employment, and is generally recognized
when (1) an employer discharges an employee in retaliation for
employee activities, and (2) the discharge contravenes a clearly man-
dated public policy.24 Its scope, however, is narrower than the public
policy exception in that the employee must be discharged in retaliation
for the employee's activities. The public policy exception only
requires that the discharge contravene a clearly mandated public pol-
icy. This difference is crucial because a plaintiff suing under the public
policy exception need only prove that the discharge was contrary to
public policy, whereas a plaintiff suing under the retaliatory discharge
theory must also prove that the discharge was in "retaliation" for his
or her activities.25
B. Attorney-Client Confidentiality and Privilege
Although the public policy exception and retaliatory discharge doc-
trine have been applied to nonprofessional employees in jurisdictions
18. See eg., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991); Herbster v. North Am. Co.
for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
19. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959); see Cornelius 3. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development
of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REv. 719, 723-24 (1991).
20. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 25.
21. Peck, supra note 19, at 723-24.
22. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
23. See Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 49-50.
24. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (Il. 1981); see also
Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ill. 1991) (quoting Palmateer).
25. In addition, this Comment proposes that the retaliatory discharge doctrine should apply
only when an employer discharges an employee for activities that actually harm the employer's
interest. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
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that recognize such causes of action, the availability of these doctrines
to in-house counsel who are both attorneys and corporate employees
has been limited. The principal roadblock preventing recognition of
these actions by in-house counsel has been concern for the effect such
recognition would have on the attorney-client relationship.
1. Attorney-Client Confidentiality and Exceptions
The scope of attorney-client confidentiality is defined by profes-
sional rules of ethics.2 6 The most influential rules are the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which have been adopted in
some form in thirty-five states.2 7 The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code), predecessor to the Model Rules, is fol-
lowed in some states that have not adopted the Model Rules.28 Both
sets of rules proscribe disclosure by an attorney of all information
about a client, regardless of when and from whom the information was
obtained.29
There are several rationales for mandatory confidentiality. First,
these ethical standards discourage attorney abuse of client information
by providing for professional disciplinary measures.30 Second, they
provide an additional safeguard to the attorney-client privilege when
there is doubt as to whether the information is privileged or not.31
Finally, the rules incorporate the general law of agency, imposing
duties on agents to keep information about their principals
confidential.32
The Model Rules and Model Code both provide exceptions to the
confidentiality rule. For example, the Model Rules permit disclosure
of confidential information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
it necessary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm." 3 The Model Code exception is broader than that of the
Model Rules, and allows a lawyer to reveal "[t]he intention of [the]
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
26. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.7, at 296 (1986).
27. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § AP4:101, app. at 1255 (2d
ed. Supp. 1991).
28. Id. at n.l. These states are Massachusetts, Oregon, Virginia, and New York. Id.
29. WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 6.7, at 298.
30. Id. at 300.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 299-300.
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
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crime.' ' 34 Under these rules, an attorney may keep information confi-
dential even if the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privi-
lege applies. 35 An attorney is thus permitted to disclose confidential
information, but is not required to do so. Nine states have adopted
more restrictive confidentiality rules requiring attorneys to report such
information on future crimes, on penalty of disbarment for failing to
do S0. 3 6
2. Attorney-Client Privilege and Crime-Fraud Exception
The attorney-client privilege is defined by the law of evidence
through statutes and judicial decisions, and its scope is narrower than
the confidentiality rule.37 It protects disclosure of information
exchanged in confidence between a client and an attorney.38 The priv-
ilege, however, applies only to communications made by a client seek-
ing legal assistance. 39  The rationale behind the attorney-client
privilege is that it is essential to the attorney's function as advocate
and confidential advisor.4° As an advocate and an advisor, the attor-
ney can adequately represent the client only if the client is free to dis-
close all information, both good and bad."
An exception to attorney-client privilege exists when a client intends
to commit a future crime or fraud. Under the crime-fraud exception,
the privilege does not extend to communications between a client and
an attorney concerning the future crime or fraud.42 A common
rationale for this exception is that the privilege should only be used as
a defense to past wrongdoing within an adversary system and not as
34. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(3) (1981).
35. Under the crime-fraud exception, the attorney-client privilege does not extend to
communications of a client's intent to commit a future crime or fraud. See infira text
accompanying notes 42-44.
36. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. IlOA, Rule 1.6(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) ("A lawyer
shall reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client
from committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm."). Besides Illinois,
states that have adopted mandatory disclosure rules are Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, New
Jersey, Nevada, North Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 27,
§ AP4:104, app. at 1262 n.2.
37. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1064-65 (1978).
38. See WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 6.3, at 264.
39. Id. at 251.
40. Hazard, supra note 37, at 1061.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1065. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, Sup. Ct. Std. 503(d)(1)
(Supp. 1990) also provides that there is no privilege "[i]f the services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or
reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud."
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an aid to future crime.' 3 Accordingly, an attorney who assists future
or continuing crimes is acting as an accessory before the fact, and is
not acting within the adversary system.44
C. The Corporate Employer as Sole Client
When an employer discloses a future illegal act to an in-house coun-
sel, or requests that the counsel participate in that act, the in-house
counsel is put in a uniquely difficult situation. Unlike a private practi-
tioner, an in-house counsel is both an employee of, and an attorney to,
the company. The in-house counsel depends solely on that employer-
client for livelihood.
Within a corporate setting, an in-house counsel may be faced with
the question of who the client is. Under the entity representation doc-
trine, an in-house counsel represents the corporate organization,
which acts only through its duly authorized constituents.45 The coun-
sel's fiduciary duty is owed to the interest of the corporation and not
to a single stockholder, director, officer, or employee of the entity."
Yet in all corporate settings, the counsel is directed by individual
officers because the corporation can only function through its constitu-
ents.47 However, when the objectives of an officer and the corporation
diverge, the in-house counsel is required to pursue the best interest of
the corporation even if it means repudiating the officer's interest.48
The conflict between an officer and an in-house counsel is greatest
when the officer rejects the counsel's advice about the illegality of pro-
posed conduct. Under the Model Rules, the counsel is clearly obliged
to seek reversal of proposed or continuing illegal conduct within the
organization.49 The options include asking the officer for reconsidera-
tion, requesting the officer to seek a separate legal opinion, and refer-
ring the matter to higher authority in the organization.5" However,
the conduct addressed by the Model Rules must relate to a violation of
a legal obligation to the corporation, or a violation of law which rea-
sonably might be imputed to the organization, and must be likely to
result in substantial injury to the organization.51 If the counsel's effort
43. WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 6.4, at 279 n.44.
44. Id. at 279.
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.13 (1983).
46. See WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 13.7, at 735.
47. Id. at 734.
48. Id. at 735.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1983). See generally
WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 13.7, at 744.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1983).
51. Id
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to correct a clear violation of law is unsuccessful despite resort to the
highest authority of the corporation, the counsel may resign.5 2 This
rule takes into account the hardship on in-house counsel, and thus
does not require a mandatory withdrawal unless further representation
violates the Model Rules or the law. 3
D. Case History of Wrongful Discharges of In-House Counsel
1. Appellate Court Treatment
The first court to deal squarely with the issue of retaliatory dis-
charge of in-house counsel was an Illinois appellate court in Herbster
v. North American Co. for Life and Health Insurance. 4 Herbster, in-
house counsel in charge of the legal department, alleged that he was
discharged for refusing to destroy files following a discovery request.55
Despite acknowledging that the discharge violated a clearly mandated
public policy of ensuring the state's interest in full and complete dis-
covery, the court refused to extend retaliatory discharge actions to
attorneys.5 6 The court reasoned that the expansion of the public pol-
icy exception rule to attorneys would seriously impair mutual trust
and the personal employment nature of the attorney-client relation-
ship.57 Thus, the Herbster court held that the tort of retaliatory dis-
charge was not available to an attorney even if the discharge was
inconsistent with public policy concerns.-8
Breaking new ground, a New Jersey appellate court recognized a
retaliatory discharge cause of action by an in-house counsel in Parker
v. M & T Chemicals, Inc. 59 In this case, a former in-house counsel
brought a retaliatory discharge action under New Jersey's Conscien-
tious Employee Protection Act (Whistleblower's Act).' The attorney
alleged that he was discharged because he refused to steal or misap-
propriate a competitor's trade secrets.6 The Parker court extended
the protection of the Whistleblower's Act to in-house counsel and held
that the statute was not inconsistent with an in-house counsel's claim
for monetary damages in a retaliatory discharge suit.62
52. Id. Rule 1.13(c).
53. WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 13.7, at 746.
54. 501 N.E.2d 343 (IIl. App. Ct. 1986).
55. Id at 344.
56. Id at 348.
57. Id at 347-48.
58. Id. at 344, 348.
59. 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
60. Id. at 216, 218.
61. Id at 217-18.
62. Id at 222.
900
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A Michigan appeals court likewise approved of a wrongful dis-
charge action by an in-house counsel based on a just cause contract in
Mourad v. Automobile Club Insurance Ass'n.63 Mourad, Automobile
Club's former legal manager, brought a wrongful discharge action
based on breach of a just cause employment contract" and retaliatory
discharge.6" The attorney claimed that he was demoted following his
refusal to comply with unethical and illegal orders.66 Noting that
Mourad provided legal as well as administrative services, the court
recognized the in-house counsel's just cause employment contract
action despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship.67 The
Mourad court, however, declined to address whether an in-house
counsel has a retaliatory discharge cause of action, observing that the
breach of just cause contract and retaliatory discharge suits are alter-
native theories of recovery.6"
2 Recent State Supreme Court Treatment
The cases above demonstrate some courts' willingness to recognize a
wrongful discharge action by an in-house counsel against the
employer. However, the courts have been reluctant to recognize retal-
iatory discharge for in-house counsel even when they have found the
discharge to be against clear public policy. Instead, some courts have
relied on a contractual basis for allowing wrongful discharge claims, to
avoid the complex questions of attorney-client relations.69
a. Nordling v. Northern States Power Co.
In Nordling v. Northern States Power Co.,70 Nordling, an in-house
counsel for Northern States Power Co. (NSP), was informed of a plan
to investigate the personal lifestyles of employees at a new company
facility.71 Believing that the plan, which included surveillance of
employees at home, was possibly illegal, Nordling reported the plan to
the general manager of the project, who shelved the plan.72 Although
63. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
64. Just cause employment contracts have been recognized when an employer fires an
employee in breach of an implied promise to discharge only for "a fair and honest cause or
reason." See Wendi J. Delmendo, Comment, Determining Just Cause: An Equitable Solution for
the Workplace, 66 WASH. L. REv. 831, 833 (1991).
65. Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 397.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 399-400.
68. Id. at 400.
69. See, eg., id.; Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. 1991).
70. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 498.
71. Id. at 500.
72. Id.
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NSP's employee handbook specified procedures. for dismissing its
employees, the vice president of NSP's law department summarily dis-
charged Nordling without warning and without following these proce-
dures.73 Nordling then filed suit against NSP and its vice president.74
The Nordling court resolved the case by holding that attorney-client
privilege does not prevent an attorney from bringing a wrongful dis-
charge claim based on an implied contract theory.75 The court, how-
ever, dismissed the retaliatory discharge action as a matter of law
because there was no violation of the state's whistleblower statute or of
any state or federal law.7 6 The court conceded that a retaliatory dis-
charge claim is more likely to involve the attorney-client relationship
than a breach of contract discharge, thereby raising issues of revealing
client confidences and wrongdoing.77 Although the Nordling court
did not rule on the retaliatory discharge issue, this case is nevertheless
important because it recognizes a wrongful discharge action by an in-
house counsel against the employer. 8
b. Balla v. Gambro, Inc.
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of retaliatory dis-
charge of in-house counsel in Balla v. Gambro, Inc. 79 Balla, the in-
house counsel for Gambro, Inc., told the president of his company
that a shipment of defective kidney dialyzers should be kept off the
market because it did not meet FDA regulations.8 0 He also told the
president that he would do whatever was necessary to stop the sale of
the dialyzers.81 The president of the company did not follow his
advice and ordered the defective product to be shipped from its affili-
ate company in Germany.82 At the same time, the company fired
Balla, who then reported the violation to the FDA.83 The FDA
promptly seized the dialyzers and determined that they were in viola-
tion of a federal act.8 4
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 502.
76. See id. at 504.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 499.
79. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
80. Id at 106.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 105-06.
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The Balla court conceded that the in-house counsel was discharged
in retaliation for his activity, and in contravention of a clearly man-
dated public policy of protecting lives and property.85 Notwithstand-
ing this finding, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an in-house
counsel has no cause of action for retaliatory discharge.86 The Balla
court reasoned that the policy of protecting the public from defective
products is already furthered by the Illinois Rules of Professional Con-
duct, which require an attorney to report a client's intention to com-
mit an act that will result in death or serious public injury. 7
Moreover, the court noted that recognition of retaliatory discharge
actions by in-house counsel would have an adverse effect on the attor-
ney-client relationship.88
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION AND
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE ACTIONS SHOULD
EXTEND TO IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
Even when courts have allowed wrongful discharge actions brought
by nonprofessional employees based on the public policy exception
and the retaliatory discharge doctrine, most courts have not extended
such causes of action to in-house counsel.8 9 The two most common
reasons given by courts are: (1) the traditional at-will employment
nature of the attorney-client relationship, and (2) the perceived
adverse effect on the attorney-client relationship.90 Although courts
have offered two seemingly separate reasons for rejecting in-house
counsel's wrongful discharge actions, the latter rationale has been used
to justify the former.91 Specifically, these courts have supported the at-
will nature of the attorney-client employment by reasoning that
allowing such wrongful discharge actions would impair the confiden-
tial nature of the attorney-client relationship.92 The possible adverse
effect on the attorney-client relationship is therefore the principal
rationale for rejecting the public policy exception and the retaliatory
discharge actions.
85. Id. at 107.
86. Id. at 108.
87. Id. at 108-09. Illinois is one of nine states that has adopted mandatory disclosure rules.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
88. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109-10.
89. See, eg., id.; Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
90. See Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
91. See, eg., Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109; Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 347.
92. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 347.
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The rationales for denying the public policy exception and the retal-
iatory discharge actions can no longer be justified. The existing attor-
ney-client relationship would not be adversely affected by recognizing
such causes of action. Moreover, given the economic realities of an in-
house counsel's employment situation and the goal of protecting the
public from illegal corporate acts, courts should extend the public pol-
icy exception and retaliatory discharge actions to in-house counsel to
mitigate the difficult burdens imposed on them.
A. Clarifying the Definition of Retaliatory Discharge
The retaliatory discharge doctrine requires proof that the employer
discharged the employee in retaliation for the employee's activities.
Most courts, however, have treated retaliatory discharge as synony-
mous with the public policy exception doctrine and thus have con-
fused the two doctrines. For example, the retaliatory discharge
doctrine enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court merely requires
that the discharge be in retaliation for the employee's activities and in
contravention of a clearly mandated public policy.93 This definition
does not sufficiently reflect the meaning of "retaliation." Some com-
mon definitions of the word "retaliate" are "[t]o return like for like,
esp[ecially] to return evil for evil" and "[t]o pay back (an injury) in
kind."94 The definition of retaliatory discharge doctrine should incor-
porate the connotation of returning injury in kind and apply only
when the employee is discharged for activities that actually harm the
employer's interest. The retaliatory discharge doctrine thus should be
recognized only when (1) an employer discharges an employee in
retaliation for employee activities that actually harm the employer,
and (2) the discharge contravenes a clearly mandated public policy.95
Under this modified definition, many claims previously classified as
retaliatory discharge actions would fall only under the public policy
exception. For example, mere refusal by an employee to do an illegal
or unethical act 96 would not amount to activity harmful to the
employer. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in ruling
that Nordling v. Northern States Power Co. did not involve sufficient
evidence of retaliation when Nordling merely reported the questiona-
93. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (Ill. 1981); see also Balla,
584 N.E.2d at 107 (quoting Palmateer).
94. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1055 (2d college ed. 1982).
95. See supra text accompanying note 24.
96. See, eg., Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 343 (discharge for refusing to destroy discovery
documents); see supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
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ble surveillance of employees to company officials.97 Nordling's
refusal to go along with the proposed plan and his reporting it to com-
pany officers did not harm the employer's economic interest. It merely
prevented the company from pursuing a potentially illegal or tortious
conduct.
Likewise, mere threats to report a contemplated illegal act are not
activities harmful to the employer's economic interest. For example,
Balla's threat to report the illegal shipment of defective dialyzers to
the FDA98 was not an activity harmful to Gambro, Inc. Such threats
may disrupt the corporate environment but the employer's economic
interest has not yet been harmed. 99
In contrast, actions such as reporting an imminent illegal act to
outside authorities and filing a workers' compensation claim are activi-
ties that harm the company's interest. So called "whistleblowing"
harms the employer's economic interest because it may subject the
employer to criminal and civil investigations and sanctions. Similarly,
filing workers' compensation claims harms the employer's economic
interest by raising the employer's workers' compensation premiums."°
Even if courts are not willing to accept the public policy exception
rule for in-house counsel, they should at least recognize retaliatory
discharge actions. By requiring the in-house counsel to prove that the
discharge was in retaliation for activities harmful to the employer, this
doctrine provides some evidentiary protection for the employer. It
also provides a remedy and protection for in-house counsel who seek
to safeguard the public from unlawful corporate conduct.
B. Public Policy Exception and Retaliatory Discharge Actions for
In-House Counsel Will Provide Increased Public Protection
Without Significant Adverse Effect on Counsel-
Company Relationship
The principal roadblock to courts' recognition of public policy
exception and retaliatory discharge actions by in-house counsel has
97. Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 1991).
98. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ill. 1991).
99. However, if the threat had been carried out before Balla was fired, Gambro, Inc. may
have been liable for civil and criminal penalties under FDA regulations that would harm the
company. See id at 106.
100. The retaliatory discharge actions in workers' compensation claims paved the way to
eventual recognition of the public policy exception doctrine in general. See, eg., Frampton v.
Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). Since Frampton, 27 states have recognized
retaliatory discharge actions for filing workers' compensation claims. See generally Jean C. Love,
Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers' Compensation Claim: The Development of a Modern
Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 554-55 (1986).
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been the supposed adverse impact on attorney-client confidentiality
and privilege, and the perceived adequacy of professional ethics rules
in preventing a client's illegal act. Recognition of such actions, how-
ever, would not adversely affect attorney-client confidentiality. More-
over, relying exclusively on the ethics of in-house counsel does not
adequately protect the overriding goal of protecting public health and
safety. In order to protect the public against illegal corporate acts, the
public policy exception and retaliatory discharge doctrine should be
recognized for in-house counsel.
L Recognition of Public Policy and Retaliatory Discharge Doctrines
Will Not Have a Chilling Effect on Attorney-Client
Relationships
Extension of the public policy exception and the retaliatory dis-
charge doctrine to in-house counsel would not sigrAficantly impair the
attorney-client relationship. If courts deny these causes of action, they
would be protecting mostly "scoundrel" employers who discharge in-
house counsel for upholding the law and ethics. On the other hand,
recognition of these wrongful discharge actions would facilitate resolu-
tion of disputes between in-house counsel and corporate officers within
the corporate organization. Moreover, in jurisdictions that have
adopted mandatory disclosure rules, the chilling effect on the attorney-
client relationship resulting from the recognition of these actions
would not be significant.
Denial of in-house counsel's discharge actions under the public pol-
icy exception and retaliatory discharge doctrine protects mostly
"scoundrel" employers who discharge a counsel for upholding law and
ethics.10 The principal argument against the recognition of such
causes of action is that an employer would be less candid regarding
potentially questionable corporate conduct knowing that the counsel
could use this information in a retaliatory suit.10 2 This argument,
however, presupposes that an employer would discharge the in-house
counsel if the attorney disagrees with the questionable conduct. Nor-
mally, corporations seek advice from in-house counsel to avoid, rather
than to commit, illegal activities in their business conduct. Corporate
employers that seek legal counsel for the purpose of avoiding illegal
acts would thus be receptive to the in-house counsel's advice. Compa-
nies that seek to gain competitive advantage at any cost by engaging in
101. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 114. (Freeman, J., dissenting). The attorney-client privilege has
been criticized as protecting only the guilty. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 6.1, at
246-47.
102. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
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illegal activities, however, are not likely to heed the in-house counsel's
advice, and are far more likely to discharge in-house counsel for
upholding the law and ethics.
Recognizing the public policy exception and the retaliatory dis-
charge action does not further impair the existing attorney-client rela-
tionship. In-house counsel's reporting of a clearly illegal act by an
officer may have no more adverse impact on attorney-client communi-
cation than when the counsel seeks a reversal of such decision by
resorting to higher authorities within the organization. Under the
entity doctrine, in-house counsel serve the corporate organization and
not corporate officers.10 3 When a corporate officer contemplates a
clearly illegal act, the in-house counsel's duty to prevent such conduct
is owed to the corporation itself, even if it means repudiating an
officer's illegal conduct or resorting to higher authorities. 1" Nor-
mally, if the higher authorities do not approve of illegal conduct as a
matter of corporate policy, the in-house counsel's resort to superiors
alone would impair the officer's willingness to communicate illegal
matters in the future. It is only when the employer condones unlawful
acts that the attorney-client relationship would be impaired.
The recognition of the public policy and retaliatory discharge doc-
trines also encourages resolution of disputes within the corporation by
creating incentives for an employer to resolve the differences within
the corporate organization. These wrongful discharge actions would
deter most employers from firing their counsel prematurely for seeking
reversal of illegal acts. This deterrent effect would encourage employ-
ers to be more receptive to their in-house counsel's advice and rein-
force in-house counsel's efforts when they resort to higher authorities
within the corporate hierarchy.
In jurisdictions that have adopted mandatory disclosure rules,10 5
the possible chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship caused by
the recognition of the public policy exception and retaliatory discharge
actions would be insignificant. Clients in those jurisdictions that man-
date disclosure may be just as likely to be hesitant to reveal their intent
to commit future crimes. In fact, by providing a rule that allows no
discretion on the part of attorneys, clients may be more reluctant to
disclose adverse information than if attorneys were given some discre-
tion on whether to disclose or not. This denial of attorneys' discretion
by mandating disclosure may reduce clients' trust in their attorneys
103. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
104. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.




far more than where they are merely aware of a possible public policy
or retaliatory discharge action by their attorneys. In this way, the
mandatory disclosure requirement would have a more significant chil-
ling effect on the attorney-client relationship than that resulting from
the recognition of these wrongful discharge actions.
2. Codes of Professional Ethics Are Not Adequate Safeguards in
Preventing Corporations' Illegal Acts
The discretionary disclosure of client confidences under both the
Model Rules and the Model Code does not adequately protect public
safety. The Model Rules permit an attorney to disclose a client's
intent to commit a crime that is likely to cause imminent death or
substantial bodily harm. 106 The Model Code is broader and provides
that an attorney may reveal the intentions of a client if necessary to
prevent a crime. 107 Under these rules, the adequacy of public protec-
tion depends on the discretion of individual attorneys.
Within the corporate environment, in-house counsel are likely to be
even more loyal to their client-company than private practitioners due
to their dependence on a single client. By foregoing disclosure of cor-
porate confidences, an in-house counsel is able to abide by the profes-
sional ethics rules and keep his or her job. In this setting, where an in-
house counsel has little incentive to report illegal acts of the company,
it is doubtful that the public will be adequately protected from such
acts.
On the other hand, requiring in-house counsel to disclose a com-
pany's future illegal act may provide adequate safeguards, at least
against that specific act. Given the chilling effect on the attorney-cli-
ent relationship by the mandatory disclosure requirement, however,10 8
the rule may have the effect of discouraging a company's disclosure of
illegal acts to counsel. Without consulting with in-house counsel, who
might dissuade a corporate officer from committing an illegal act, the
rule may result in increased illegal corporate acts in the long run.
Internal dispute provisions in the Model Rules for in-house counsel
do not adequately address the prevention of illegal corporate acts. The
Model Rules outline steps a corporate counsel is obligated to pursue
within the organization to seek reversal of a corporate decision that
violates a legal obligation to the organization, or violates a law which
106. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1983).
107. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1981).
108. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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reasonably might be imputed to the organization."°9 Counsel, how-
ever, may not disclose such information if it does not meet the crime
and substantial injury requirements specified in rule 1.6. Counsel has
the option of resigning if unsuccessful in obtaining reversal of the pro-
posed violation.'1 0 Although the requirement for corporate counsel to
seek reversal within the organization is reasonable because it encour-
ages resolution of disputes internally, it provides neither sufficient dis-
closure, nor adequate protection of the public from the corporation's
illegal acts.
The policy of protecting the public from illegal corporate conduct
should be at least as important as the economic interests of attor-
neys. 1  The Model Rules and Model Code allow attorneys to disclose
confidential information to establish a claim for legal fees against cli-
ents. 112 These rules implicitly recognize that an attorney's economic
interest has priority over attorney-client privilege and confidentiality.
When in-house counsel seek to protect the public from their client's
unlawful acts, they should be given the same degree of protection
afforded to attorneys who sue their clients for their own economic
interest.
C. The In-House Counsel's Dilemma
The professional ethics rules place in-house counsel who possess
knowledge of illegal employer acts in a difficult position. An attorney
who blows the whistle on an employer's illegal acts may be termi-
nated. An attorney who remains silent may be disbarred for violation
of the ethics rules, or may even be personally liable to potential victims
of illegal corporate acts."'
L Economic Consequences of In-House Counsel's Termination
Unlike private practitioners, in-house counsel depend on single cli-
ent-employers for their entire incomes. If in-house counsel become
privy to a client's unethical or illegal acts, this arrangement deprives
109. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1983). Counsel may ask
reconsideration of the decision, advise that a second legal opinion be sought, or refer the matter
to the higher authority in the organization. Id.
110. See id. Rule 1.13(c). However, counsel must withdraw if representation would violate
rules of professional conduct or other law. See id Rule 1.16(a)(1).
111. Even the Balla court conceded that there is no policy more important than the public
policy of protecting the lives and property of the public. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104,
107-08 (Ill. 1991).
112. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1981).
113. Hazard, supra note 37, at 1068-69.
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them of the significant independence that private practitioners enjoy.
Private practitioners may withdraw from representing their client and
report the incidents to the proper authorities, thus abiding by the rules
of professional conduct without incurring total economic loss. The
client a practitioner loses is but one of many, and thus the economic
impact would not be as severe as that of a fired in-house counsel in
most circumstances.114
In-house counsel generally do not enjoy such diversity of clients.
Like all other employees of a company, in-house counsel are expected
to further company objectives. When the means used to achieve the
company's objectives are illegal, in-house counsel may be obligated to
report such incidents under professional ethics codes to the detriment
of their employment status within the company. If they do not report
the illegal acts of the employer, they may be disbarred. In both situa-
tions, their loss is total, both economically and professionally. If they
report and lose their employment, they must start over in establishing
a practice or look for another job, having been stigmatized as a
whistleblower. If they do not report, they risk losing their privilege of
practicing law altogether. Such is the dilemma of in-house counsel.
This dilemma puts in-house counsel in a particularly difficult posi-
tion to protect the public against illegal corporate conduct. Sound rea-
sons exist to limit public policy and retaliatory discharge actions by
attorneys to some degree. At present, in-house counsel bear the heavy
economic and social burden with little mitigating protection. This
burden should not be imposed on in-house counsel without providing
relief through wrongful discharge actions.
'2. Role of In-House Counsel Within the Employment Setting
In-house counsel frequently assume additional functions such as
administrative and personnel duties." 5 Sometimes they cease practic-
ing law altogether to work as administrative and personnel officers. In
denying the public policy and retaliatory discharge causes of action,
some courts have emphasized that in-house counsel were licensed to
114. Even lawyers working in law firms are provided some internal procedures to guard
against such hardship. Law firm associates receive their instructions from lawyers who are
obligated to uphold the code of professional ethics. See generally Kenneth J. Wilbur, Wrongful
Discharge of Attorneys: A Cause of Action to Further Professional Responsibility, 92 DICK. L.
REv. 777, 782 (1988).
115. For example, the in-house counsel in Balla v. Gambro, Inc., leld additional positions of
director of administration and personnel, and manager of regulatory affairs. Balla, 584 N.E.2d
at 106. Also, the court in Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, noted that the counsel was
acting in an administrative role. Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 400
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
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practice law within its jurisdiction at all times.' 16 This is a factor that
should not be significant when in-house counsel assume duties other
than those which attorneys typically perform.
When in-house counsel become privy to illegal corporate acts in
capacities other than as a corporate counsel, they should be treated
like any other non-lawyer employees in extending public policy and
retaliatory discharge actions. In these situations, where licensed attor-
neys are not practicing law, the usual concerns for the attorney-client
relationship should have little relevance, and public policy and retalia-
tory discharge actions should be allowed.
D. Nordling Is a Breakthrough in Recognizing Wrongful Discharge
Action by In-House Counsel
Nordling was the first state supreme court case to recognize a
wrongful discharge action by an in-house counsel, albeit on an implied
contract basis. The Nordling court seemed ready to accept retaliatory
discharge actions by in-house counsel if it found a violation of the
state's whistleblower statute, but Nordling was unable to prove the
violation of any federal or state law." 7 The significant distinction
between Nordling and Balla, however, seems to be that in Nordling,
the planned surveillance was never carried out, '18 while in Balla, the
defective dialyzers were actually shipped for sale in violation of FDA
regulation. '1 9 Mere contemplation of an illegal act did not give rise to
an actionable public policy exception or retaliatory discharge.
E. Critique of Balla v. Gambro, Inc.
Although the Balla court correctly refused to recognize a retaliatory
discharge action by the in-house counsel, it should have extended the
public policy exception doctrine to such counsel.120 In denying the
latter cause of action, the Balla court disregarded economic realities
and the unique hardship faced by in-house counsel. Balla presented a
compelling case for recognizing a wrongful discharge action based on
the public policy exception. The Balla court conceded that the dis-
charge was in violation of a clearly mandated public policy of protect-
116. See Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110; Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501
N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
117. Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 1991).
118. Id. at 500.
119. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 106.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100. The retaliatory discharge doctrine referred
to by the Balla court should be the public policy exception doctrine according to the modified
definition of retaliatory discharge doctrine.
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big lives and property.12 Under the Illinois mandatory disclosure
rule, in-house counsel have no remedy under the public policy excep-
tion or retaliatory discharge doctrine even when acting to protect pub-
lic health and safety.
The Balla court distinguished the dilemma faed by an in-house
counsel from an employee faced with the choice of whether or not to
file a workers' compensation claim. 22 It noted that while in-house
counsel has no choice but to report under the Illinois mandatory dis-
closure rule, an employee eligible for workers' compensation benefits
has a choice whether or not to file a claim. 23 This distinction is
highly artificial and is not persuasive. Employers sometimes terminate
employees who fie such claims.124 In most states, however, such ter-
minations are deterred by the extension of the retaliatory discharge
doctrine.125
In-house counsel face a situation analogous to an employee filing a
workers' compensation claim without any statutory or judicial protec-
tion for wrongful discharge. In-house counsel have no remedy for dis-
charge when reporting an illegal act of an employer under the Balla
court's holding. As the Balla court conceded, reporting illegal corpo-
rate acts would almost certainly lead to termination of the in-house
counsel.1 26 The economic loss suffered by terminated in-house counsel
is therefore substantially the same as that of ordinary workers dis-
charged for whistleblowing.
The Balla court disapproved of retaliatory discharge because it
would shift the burden and cost of obeying the attorney's Rules of
Professional Conduct to the employer. 2 7 The Balla court stated that
the attorney would have to forego "economic gains" in order to pro-
tect the integrity of the legal profession.1 28 What the in-house counsel
foregoes, however, is not merely "economic gains," but employment
and livelihood. 12 9
The Balla court's treatment of the withdrawal by an in-house coun-
sel as equal to the discharge by the employer does not adequately take
into account the hardship on the in-house counsel. The Balla court
noted that the in-house counsel was required to withdraw from repre-
121. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 107-08.
122. Id. at 109.
123. Id
124. See, eg., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
125. See Love, supra note 100, at 554 n.26.
126. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110.
127. Id
128. Id.
129. Id. at 115 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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senting Gambro, Inc. under Illinois law. 130 The court reasoned that
because Gambro, Inc. fired BaUa, it satisfied the statute's require-
ment.131 Even the Model Rules recognize the unique nature of this
hardship and provide that attorneys serving corporations "may"
resign when they are unable to prevent illegal corporate conduct.132
By making the reporting mandatory, the Illinois professional code
gives no alternative to an in-house counsel and includes no mitigating
provisions.
The attorney-client privilege and confidentiality cannot justify the
Balla court's refusal to recognize the public policy exception. The Illi-
nois mandatory disclosure requirement probably has more of a chilling
effect on the attorney-client relationship than the extension of public
policy and retaliatory discharge actions to in-house counsel. 3
Equally important, the public policy of protecting lives and property
of citizens is not adequately protected by relying exclusively on in-
house counsel to report illegal acts. 34 The end result of the denial of
the public policy exception cause of action by in-house counsel is that
corporations may be encouraged to commit illegal acts.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the majority of courts recognize the public policy excep-
tion and retaliatory discharge doctrine, most courts still refuse to
extend these doctrines to in-house counsel. 35 There are no longer
sound justifications for withholding such wrongful discharge relief
from in-house counsel. Recognition of these actions by in-house coun-
sel would not have a significant adverse impact on the attorney-client
relationship. Moreover, the existing professional codes of ethics do
not adequately safeguard the public against illegal corporate conduct.
By recognizing the public policy exception and retaliatory discharge
actions, courts can provide additional protection for the public against
illegal corporate conduct, without significant impact on the existing
counsel-company relationship. At the same time, these actions would
provide a way out of the economic and moral dilemma faced by in-
house counsel.
130. Id. at 110. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, Rules 1.16(a)(2), (a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1991).
131. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110.
132. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c) (1983); see also
WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 13.7, at 746.
133. See supra text accompanying note 105.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12.
135. See, eg., Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 104; Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins.,
501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
